[Archimedes Talk Series] Cardinal-Utility Matching Markets: From Tractability to Intractability ... and Back!

This talk will summarize several papers which:
a. Established intractability.
b. Proposed a replacement mechanism based on Nash bargaining.
c. Established its game-theoretic and computational properties and gave evidence that there may not be a better alternative.

Based on these (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) and other papers.

Bio: Vijay Vazirani is Distinguished Professor at the University of California, Irvine. A description of his research appears in the citation of his 2022 INFORMS John von Neumann Theory Prize. Recently he completed a proof of the Micali-Vazirani maximum matching algorithm, over four decades after the publication of the algorithm itself. His most recent book (co-edited), Online and Matching-Based Market Design, appeared in July 2023.